Civ. Case 83-D-67, 20/3/68
Georges C.
J.
Defendant had engaged plaintiff, an
advocate, for the sale of certain land. After a rather careless handling of
defendant’s affairs, characterized by the High Court as “offhand” and
“indifferent”, plaintiff secured the signature of a purchaser on a transfer
deed. Defendant also executed this deed. The property had been pledged with the
National Bank of Commerce in Dodoma, by notice of deposit of title deeds This
bank handed over the deed to plaintiff, who sent it for registration to the
Commissioner of Lands. Defendant, however, feeling that the value of the
transaction had been seriously impaired by plaintiff’s handling of it, sent two
letters to the Commissioner of Lands; one was marked as copied to both the bank
and purchaser, and one marked as copied to the bank only. These letters accused
the plaintiff of “grave breach of trust”, and requested that the Commissioner
withhold his approval of the transaction. There was no dispute as to whether
the letters were defamatory; the High Court rejected the defence of
justification, finding insufficient evidence of “breach of trust.” The
remaining issues were “qualified privilege” and “malice.”
HELD:
(1) “The authorities are clear .. that a privileged occasion arises where the
defendant has an interest in making the communication to the third person, and
the third person has a corresponding interest in receiving,, it ….. (T)his
reciprocity is of the essence of the matter …. Here, defendant’s interest is
clear. The Commissioner is sufficiently “interested”, since the transaction depends
upon his consent. The bank is “interested”, since the property had been pledged
with it, and since it had had to surrender the deed for registration. The
purchaser was “interested” as a party to the transaction which the defendant
was seeking to avoid, and because plaintiff had been acting for both the
defendant and the purchaser in seeking to have the transaction registered.
(2) Since all of the defendant’s
communications were made under “qualified privilege”, malice must be proved.
(3) Malice in such cases is not established merely by showing that the words
used were not “reasonably necessary to protect the interest .. which is the
foundation f (the) privilege; (the defendant) will be protected, even though
his language should be violent or excessively strong if ……he might honestly and
on reasonable grounds have believe that what he wrote … was true and necessary
for the purpose of his vindication, though in fact it was not so.” [Quoting
Adam v. Ward (1917) A. C. 309] Also, “the question is whether (defendant) is
using the occasion honestly or abusing it ……But there is a state of mind, short
of deliberate falsehood, by reason of which a person may properly be held ..
to have abused the occasion. It has been
said that anger would be such a state of mind.” [Quoting Royal Aquarium and
Summer & Winter Garden Society v. Parkinson (1892) 1Q.B. 431, 443]. If,
through anger, defendant were “reckless” with the truth, he may be said to have
abused an occasion of qualified privilege.
(4) On the facts, the defendant here
did abuse the occasion, and so loses his qualified privilege.
(5) The plaintiff
himself provoked the state of anger which led to the defamatory outburst. The
“area of publication “ was very narrow, and No specific financial or other
detriment to plaintiff has been shown. The defendant’s allegations were
serious, but this it not a case for substantial damages. Shs. 1,000/- awarded
to plaintiff, plus taxed costs.
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